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BOOK REVIEWS
ThE STOCKOLDER'S REMEDY OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION. By
James O'Malley Tingle. Missoula, Montana: Montana State
University Press, 1959. Pp. 238. $12.00.
This book is actually a reprint of a dissertation for the Doctor
of the Science of Law degree which Mr. Tingle, I assume, received
largely as a result of this work. It is commended by the Dean of
Mr. Tingle's undergraduate law school, the University of Montana,
and a professor from the University of Michigan from which he
received his graduate degree.
Mr. Tingle tells us in the preface (and this is borne out in the
book itself) that the work is divided into three parts. Chapter 1
is devoted to dissolution on the ground of majority oppression.
The next three chapters discuss dissolution on the ground of
"deadlock," while the last (fifth) chapter is devoted to the author's
proposals for adequate legislation on the subject.
Chapter 1 starts off abruptly, using perhaps what is supposed
to be a Maugham touch, with the facts of a Michigan case, the
citation of which is given to us on the fourth page of the text
(called, however, page 20), the holding of which Mr. Tingle approves
(p. 34). A "flashback" discussion of the common law is then
given us, devoted primarily to showing us that a court of equity
has an inherent right to dissolve corporations, before we return
to the conclusion to be drawn from the "big" case (Miner v. Belle
Island Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892)), that "the
majority must have shown that they can no longer be trusted to
manage the corporation fairly in the interest of all stockholders;
in a word that they are incorrigible" (p. 43) before dissolution for
majority oppression will be decreed.
After a review of statutes on the subject, however, Mr. Tingle
seems to conclude that maybe it would be better if the majority were
forced to buy out the minority instead of having a dissolution
(p. 63).
After this rather inconclusive discussion, the author goes on
to the main subject of the book, dissolution as a result of deadlock.
A short chapter is devoted to drawing the analogy between cor-
porate and partnership dissolution, and suggesting that the test for
corporate dissolution should be, as it is for partnership dissolution,
"whether mutual confidence and cooperation persist." (p. 73) The
test should not be, as is repeated a number of times later, whether
or not the corporation is able to operate at a profit despite the
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conflict among the participants, but should rather be whether or
not there has been a denial of management participation to the
offended group (pp. 74, 102, 117, 118, 119, 127, 187, 188).
The author concludes this chapter by drawing an interesting
distinction between complete and incomplete deadlock. These are
defined as follows (p. 75):
A deadlock may arise when the control of a corporation is equally divided
between two stockholders or factions. As noted, usually but not always
this requires an equal division of the controlling stock. To simplify the
present definition of deadlock the discussion will be in terms of an equal
division of shares. Deadlock takes different forms. If the directory is odd-
numbered an equal division of the stockholders results in the fortuitous
control of that faction represented by a majority of the directors. The
directory holds over until its successors are elected, and it is able to function.
This is the sense in which "holdover" will be used when it describes a
directory. Such a directory of course represents only one faction. This
may be called incomplete deadlock. If the directory is even-numbered and
the directors and stockholders divide equally on corporate decisions, manage-
ment by the directory fails. If the business continues it will be the work
of holdover executive officers or usurpers. This kind of deadlock may be
called complete deadlock. The cases will demonstrate that each kind of
deadlock violates the right to participate in corporate management.
Chapter 3 discusses dissolution at common law in terms of
these two types of deadlock. Chapter 4 is devoted to cases of both
types of deadlock as affected by statutes purporting to authorize
deadlock dissolution.
An elaborate case by case, and case on statute discussion, with
ample citation of decisions and overly-ample factual treatment of the
cases themselves (one gets the feeling that a number of student
"briefs" have been strung together, which the author's cavalier
attitude toward the old grammatical requirement of complete sen-
tences-see pp. 85, 87, 89, 118-reinforces) concludes with the not
unexpected finding that in the majority of jurisdictions, whether or
not they have statutes on the subject, the courts are reluctant to
decree dissolution where the corporation, despite the deadlock, is
able to operate at a profit (pp. 128, 174).
The result under the decided cases is the same whether there is
complete or incomplete deadlock, as the author has defined these
phenomena. The distinction is insignificant, however, by this point,
since the cases themselves do not draw it, and the author, too,
indicates its practical unworkableness by departing from it himself.
For example, he suggests on pages 126-27 that an appropriate
standard for dissolution in the case of incomplete deadlock is the
failure of a directory to represent a majority of the shareholders,
a manifest impossibility if the author's definition of incomplete
deadlock is accepted, since the board can never represent a majority
of the shareholders where there are only two, each owning an equal
number of shares.
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The author might have reached this conclusion, that courts
are reluctant to dissolve profitable corporations even though their
participants are at loggerheads, by a lot less effort on his own
part, and that of the reader, through more condensed writing,
but then this dissertation would have been merely a brief law review
article (as I think it perhaps should have been) rather than a
book. I am perhaps overly suspicious of a book which starts
on page 17, finds it necessary to add footnotes numbered 137a
(p. 52), la (p. 65), 6a (p. 67) etc. (obviously at the last minute),
and devotes 20 (almost a tenth) of its numbered pages out of a
total of 238 to the Table of Cases and Index. Big type and wide
margins are, of course, a help in reading. Perhaps, also, every
hour of research should produce an amount of print proportional
to the effort. Obviously, my opinions (as the author of overly-
long law review articles, and only chapters in a book) to the
contrary are not completely above suspicion. I cannot help but
think, however, that the book is "padded."
This statement is obviously not to be interpreted as detracting
from Mr. Tingle's scholarship. He has made an extensive study
of the subject, and his concluding chapter, which sets out a minutely
detailed proposed statute for solving the problem of corporate
dissolution is certainly the result of a great deal of thought. (Since
I have, upon occasion, attempted to draft proposed statutes, I am
fully aware of the amount of work involved.)
Chapter 5, then, is the culmination of the study. After the
overly-long exposition (128 pages) of the common-law cases on
deadlock dissolution, and the disproportionately short chapter on
statutes authorizing deadlock dissolution (46 pages, when 21 states
have enacted statutes on the matter) we finally get Mr. Tingle's
ideas on the subject of a proper statute for corporate dissolution
based on deadlock. Dissolution for majority oppression is also
included, as the first part of the suggested law. Here, for some
reason, space-saving is attempted, so we do not get a copy of
the entire statute as proposed, but must be content to piece it
together from the various places in the text in which its parts
appear. This is unfortunate since the text omits the designation
"A" before the first part of the statute on page 180, leading to
confusion when references are later made to (A) (1) and (A) (2)
on page 209, unless one remembers that a footnote (20) on the
earlier page gives us the commencement of the statute.
Consistent with his conclusion that incorrigibility is the proper
test for dissolution where the majority is oppressing the minority
(see p. 182), the proposed statute allows such dissolution:
(1) When those in continuing control of the corporation have by illegal,
fraudulent, oppressive, or other action or inaction demonstrated that they can




After a subsection (p. 184) setting forth the "purpose" of
the above section, Mr. Tingle goes on to give us his suggested
provisions for deadlock dissolution. Dissolution is to be granted:
(2) When participation in the executive management of the corporate
business is denied to a plaintiff (or plaintiffs voting continuously as a unit)
owning a percentage of the corporation's stock sufficient to cause a stalemate
in an election of directors.
"Participation" is denied, we are told, when the plaintiff is
"excluded from the executive management of the corporate busi-
ness," or "cannot longer participate therein, under conditions of
mutual confidence and cooperation." (p. 196) The purpose of
the section is to allow dissolution only where there is "irreconcilable
dissension." Where the plaintiff himself is the cause of this dis-
sension, dissolution is to be denied except where the court de-
termines that "mutually confident and cooperative joint management
is impossible or improbable." (p. 196)
The dissolution for majority oppression section is designed to
protect the shareholders' "interest" (in the Poundian sense), in
"corporate management in good faith, more specifically, the honest
acquisition and distribution of profits." (p. 185) The provision for
deadlock dissolution is devised to protect the shareholder's "right
to participate in corporate management," (pp. 187, 188) the
interest which Tingle feels dissolution for deadlock statutes are
really designed to safeguard.
I am not so sure that dissolution should ever be granted for
"majority oppression," even were the standard to be (if it could
be) less vaguely expressed than Tingle proposes. In a-footnote,
(p. 181 n. 22) he states that "probably" Henry Ford's actions
as principal stockholder in failing to declare dividends, the subject-
matter of the famous Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. case, 204 Mich.
459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), would not meet the test for dissolution
under his majority oppression provision. Let us hope not. Tingle
concedes, in a number of places, that "liquidation is harsh." (p. 208;
see also, pp. 41, 47, 64) In a large corporation, other remedies
are usually sufficient (e. g., a shareholder's suit as in the Ford case).
The "oppression" may perhaps be viewed as a continuing nuisance,
and thus justify a more drastic remedy to avoid a multiplicity of
lawsuits. It is more likely, however, in a public issue corporation
where the "majority" is widely dispersed among small shareholdings
that this will not be the case, for the simple reason that any con-
tinuing "oppression" will turn out to be an honest business judgment
and hence not oppression at all. In a close corporation, I am
tempted to agree with the view of one of the cases that Tingle
criticizes. The oppressed participants have only themselves to blame
and hence do not deserve help. (p. 83) In a close corporation,
the minority participant has a number of ways of protecting himself
from such oppression, the principal one being to assure himself a
"veto" over all corporate decisions through high vote requirements.
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If he does not exact such a concession from the majority participants
he has only himself (or his inadequate lawyer) to blame for his
plight. As Tingle concedes, dissolution itself may be a form of
oppression (p. 209). Such a statute as he proposes may make it
an instrument of minority oppression, which is certainly as bad as,
if not worse than, oppression by the majority.
With regard to his dissolution for deadlock provisions much
the same thing can be said. Clearly he is right in asserting that
dissolution should not be denied merely because a deadlocked cor-
poration is still able to operate at a profit. His summary of the
New York cases (pp. 137-61) demonstrates that they were incor-
rectly decided, because made to turn exclusively on the continued
profitability of the corporation. He is, however, wrong in rejecting
economic factors as the interest to be protected in such deadlock
dissolutions in favor of exclusion from participation in management.
This should not be the criterion for two reasons: first, participation
in management, although it may be the most effective guarantee
of the actual end, is not an end in itself, (hence, not a real "interest")
but instead only a means to the economic end of a fair distribution
of the corporate profits, which is what the participants really want:
and, secondly, even if participation is really the desideratum, the
shareholder again has only himself to blame if he fails to secure
such participation through appropriate charter, by-law or share-
holder agreement provisions, and liquidation should not be available
to extricate him from his bad bargain at the expense of the other
participants (see p. 41).
Often, in reality, it is not the denial of participation which
produces the situation calling for dissolution, but its very opposite.
The famous case of Matter of Radom & Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1,
119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) is a good example. The very reason for
the deadlock was the power which the defendant equal shareholder
held over corporate policies. Her right to equal management
participation was the cause of the irreconcilable conflict which jus-
tified the dissolution (mistakenly denied because there was not
complete economic paralysis of the corporation).
There are too many intangibles, all of which must be weighed
in each case, and differing with each case, to set a precise rule
decreeing automatic dissolution on any one circumstance, even were
the correct one chosen (and I don't believe that denial of par-
ticipation in management is a correct one). The approach taken
by the proposed new New York Business Corporation Law seems
sounder. Dissolution is still left to the discretion of the court (thus
allowing a consideration of the potential harm to all parties from a
forced sale, and a balancing of the advantages against the foreseeable
disadvantages), as case law under the present statute has held it
to be. However, to guard against the judicial over-reluctance,
pointed out by Mr. Tingle, to dissolve a profitable corporation,
it is expressly provided that "dissolution is not to be denied merely
[ VOL. 35
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because it is found that the corporate business has been or could
be conducted at a profit." (S. 3316, s. 11.23) Further, in ad-
dition to the old "complete deadlock" provisions, as Mr. Tingle
would call them (petition where the directors' or shareholders'
votes are so divided as to cause a stalemate), dissolution may also
be petitioned where "there is internal dissension and two or more
factions of shareholders are so divided that the corporation's business
cannot longer be conducted with advantage to the shareholders."
The profit test suggested by the latter words would seem ap-
propriately negatived by the statutory caveat already discussed.
The new statute also allows, without the shareholder percentage
requirements found for an action on any of the above grounds, a
petition for dissolution "on the ground that the votes of the
shareholders are so divided that they have failed, for a period which
includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect
successors to directors whose terms have expired. . . ." (S. 3316,
s. 11.05) Although Mr. Tingle might criticize the 'latter as dealing
with the "symptoms" rather than the real disease of corporate
deadlock (see p. 195), such a symptom is a pretty good indication
of the presence of such deadlock, itself not a symptom of lack of
corporate participation, but merely of internal dissension harmful
to at least one of the shareholders, and hence calling for action
by the court to safeguard the interests of all.
The proposed New York provisions are perhaps not perfect,
but they are flexible enough to authorize a court to decree dissolution
when, after that fine balancing of harms versus benefits to all of the
shareholders, it decides that dissolution is the best course open.
Further, although an appropriate guide is given (i. e., dissolution
may not be denied merely because the corporation is still in good
financial condition), it is not so rigid as to require dissolution
merely because one participant has been, through his own fault,
voted off the board of directors, a case in which dissolution may
well be to everybody's financial disadvantage, including that of the
objecting plaintiff.
Although the two basic statutory provisions, that for dissolu-
tion for oppression and that for deadlock dissolution, suggested by
Mr. Tingle, do not seem satisfactory, his "ancillary provisions" might
well merit serious consideration by statutory revisors. At the
end of the book he returns to the idea that dissolution is a drastic
remedy, and the thought that a buy-out of one faction by the
other might be preferable.
Even though an action for dissolution has been commenced,
"any stockholder wishing to end the proceeding should be permitted
to buy the stock of the plaintiff." (p. 199) Provision is also made
for possible purchase of the defendant's stock by the plaintiffs.
(pp. 214-16) The full texts of Mr. Tingle's various statutory
sections are too lengthy to set forth here, but, in general, they
are designed to insure that, regardless of who brings the action,
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innocent shareholders will receive the full value ("the price that
an informed investor would pay for the shares as a continuing
investment if the corporation were being controlled and managed in
good faith"-p. 206) of their shares whether the corporation is
liquidated or they are bought out, thus protecting their real financial
interest. Appraisal provisions are added to assure (as well as
that "black art" can) that this real value will be fairly ascertained
(pp. 205-06).
Whether or not Mr. Tingle's statutory language is an im-
provement over the three enacted statutes (those of California,
West Virginia and Connecticut-pp. 198-99), he is clearly correct
in proposing a buy-out at appraised values as a means of obviating
liquidation. Authorizing the court, as an alternative to decreeing
dissolution, to order one opposing faction to purchase the shares
of the other at their fair value is a desirable addition to any dead-
lock dissolution statute, since this is obviously a more satisfactory
way to break the deadlock than a forced sale. The danger of grave
financial injury to one or perhaps both of the warring factions from
liquidation is probably the real reason for the reluctance of courts
to dissolve solvent corporations. They would undoubtedly welcome
this less "drastic," because less harmful, alternative.
ROBERT A. KESSLER.*
*Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
